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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
MARTHA A. ARREGUI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

)
)
)
)

)
)

Supreme Court No. 38496-2011

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

ROSALINDA
GALLEGOS-MAIN,
an)
individual; FULL LIFE CHIROPRACTIC, )
P.A., an Idaho professional association; and )
John and Jane Does 1 through X, whose true )
identities are unknown,
)
)

Defendants-Respondents.

)
)
)

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
CANYON
HONORABLE RENAE HOFF, PRESIDING DISTRICT JUDGE

Sam Johnson, ISB No.4 777
JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, L.L.P.
405 South Eighth Street, Suite 250
Boise,ID 83702

Richard H. Greener, ISB No. 1191
Loren K. Messerly, ISB No. 7434
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III.

ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A.

Introduction

Defendants-Respondents Rosalinda Gallegos-Main, D.C., and her clinic - Full
Life Chiropractic, P.A., (collectively hereinafter, "Chiropractor Main"), proffer in the
first sentence of their Respondent's Brief that: "This is a medical malpractice case
involving allegations of chiropractic physician malpractice." See Respondent's Brief, p. 1
(emphasis added).

This case is plainly not a "medical malpractice case".

In fact,

Plaintiff-Appellant Martha Arregui (hereinafter "Arregui") has definitively shown that
chiropractic physicians, by express legislative declaration, do not hold a license to
practice medicine in the state of Idaho. See Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 15. Idaho
Code § 54-704(3) provides:
"Chiropractic practice, as herein defined is hereby declared
not to be the practice of medicine within the meaning of the
laws of the state of Idaho defining the same, and physicians
licensed pursuant to this chapter shall not be subject to the
provisions of chapter 18, title 54, Idaho Code, nor liable to
any prosecution there under, when acting within the scope
of practice as defined in this chapter." (Emphasis added).
In spite of this clear legislative declaration that chiropractic physicians do not practice
medicine, Chiropractor Main erroneously characterizes the very nature of this case as one
involving medical malpractice. The inaccurate characterization of the nature of the case
may be innocent enough in the singular, but represents only one exemplar of a string of
mischaracterizations that start from the first sentence and run through the remainder of
the brief submitted by Chiropractor Main.
At the end of the day, this case involves the district court's commission of clear
error when applying the "sham affidavit" doctrine to a case that does not involve a sham.
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In fact, the district court acknowledged the lack of a sham on the record when stating,
"And as Mr. Johnson pointed out, I find no - no deception on the part of the
chiropractor." Tr., p. 62, Ll. 4-6 (emphasis added).
B.

Arregui did not suggest the Sham Affidavit Doctrine does not or
should never apply to Testimony given by Expert Witnesses.

The next mischaracterization made by Chiropractor Main, perhaps worthy of a
reply, relates to the distinction drawn by Arregui between expert witnesses and fact
witnesses. Arregui does not contend on appeal that the "sham affidavit" doctrine does
not apply to expert witnesses.

Nonetheless, Chiropractor Main incorrectly states,

"[Arregui's] sole argument is that the sham affidavit does not apply to expert witnesses,
i.e. clear contradictions from an expert are allowed because experts are allowed to

'update' their testimony at any time." Respondent's Brief, p. 21. This statement by
Chiropractor Main reflects a serious misunderstanding of Arregui's position on appeal.
Arregui's point in her Opening Brief is only that there is a distinction between lay
witness testimony and expert witness opinions, and the difference in the two ought to be
considered when a court is looking to "prevent[] the use of manufactured testimony" in
line with the rule taken from Boise Tower Associates, LLC v. Washington Capital Joint
Master Trust, 2007 WL 1035158, 12-13 (D. Idaho).

In fact, an expert witness is permitted if not expected to make factual assumptions
when rendering opinions. In Evans v. Cavanagh, 58 Idaho 324, 327, 73 P.2d 83, 86
(1937), the Idaho Supreme Court succinctly addressed the role of the expert when faced
with conflicting evidence:
The testimony of an expert as to his opinion is not evidence
of a fact in dispute, but is advisory, only, to assist the triers
of fact to understand and apply the testimony of other
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witnesses. Its value depends on, arnong other things, the
expert confining himself in his testimony to the facts
incorporated in the question propounded to him, and if he
does not assume these facts to be true and base his answer
on them, his testimony is worthless and should be rejected.
It is for the triers of fact to determine whether the evidence
on which the expert bases his opinion is true or not. It is
not for the expert to assume the responsibility of
determining the truth or falsity-the reliability or
unreliability, of the testimony of other witnesses. For this
reason he should not be asked to base his opinion on the
testimony of other witnesses which he has heard, but the
facts which that testimony tends to establish, and which is
relied on by the party propounding the question, should be
hypothetically stated, and the testimony of the expert
should be responsive to that question, and it is his duty to
assume those facts to be true.
Citing Cochran v. Gritrnan, 34 Idaho 654, 203 P. 289.
Here, Arregui is forced to continue to make the distinction between experts and
fact witnesses for a valid reason. She does it because Chiropractor Main first below and
now on appeal, through the creation of a table, continues to compare Dr. Tarnai's
affidavit testimony with her deposition testimony in a disingenuous manner.
Respondent's Brief, pp. 23-24. In setting up this table, Chiropractor Main primarily
attempts to illustrate Dr. Tarnai has been inconsistent in testifying about whether
Chiropractor Main performed a "cervical adjustment" on Arregui or merely performed a
"range of motion" test. Id
However, as Dr. Tarnai explained during her deposition, it is not so much that she
has been inconsistent on this factual issue, but more so that the record is in conflict on
this point. On several occasions during the course of her deposition, Dr. Tarnai made
note of the conflict in the record between Arregui' s description of the treatment provided
compared to Chiropractor Main's description of the treatment provided.
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See Tarnai

Depo. Tr.,p. 27, LI.I0-24;p. 34,

LI.18~p.

35, LI. 6;pp. 159-161, startingatR., Vol.

II, p. 168. When Dr. Tarnai presumes a cervical rotational adjustment was done, she has
consistently opined that this would be unreasonable and imprudent or contraindicated or
in breach of the standard of care. See Tarnai Depo. Tr., p. 161, LI. 10 - p. 162, LI. I,

starting at R., Vol. II, p. 218; see also Affidavit ofSarah Tarnai, D.C

~7

at R., Vol. I, p.

138; see also Dr. Tarnai's October 15, 2010, written report, second to last paragraph at
R., Vol. I, p. 146.
Thus, to the extent Dr. Tarnai's testimony in relation to whether Chiropractor
Main simply tested Arregui's range of motion or performed a cervical adjustment is
inconsistent, it is adequately explained on the basis that in one instance Dr. Tarnai
presumes Arregui's version is true and in other instances presumes Chiropractor Main's
version is true. As stated in the passage quoted from Evans, supra, "It is not for the
expert to assume the responsibility of determining the truth or falsity ... of the testimony
of other witnesses." Id As Dr. Tarnai confessed in her deposition, she does not know
who is right - doctor or patient - but it is not her job to make such a determination as that
task belongs to the jury.
Perhaps most compelling on this front is the fact the district court never found a
single inconsistency along the lines of any of the alleged inconsistencies cited in the table
created by Chiropractor Main. See Tr., pp. 38-43. The only inconsistency noted by the
district court had to do with the fact at the time of her deposition Dr. Tarnai had not yet
spoken to a local expert, but by the time of the making of her affidavit she had:
I further conclude that the affidavit clearly contradicts the
prior deposition testimony and that it was clear that at that
time, Dr. Tarnai was not aware of the local standard of care
in this community.
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Id at p. 39, Ll. 17-23.

However, the district court's decision to strike the Tarnai Affidavit on the basis of
the aforementioned single inconsistency, constituted clear error. The "general rule" from
the sham affidavit doctrine only applies if the court, "make [s] a factual determination that
the contradiction was actually a 'sham.'''. Kennedy v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co., 952
F2d 262, 267 (9 th Cir. 1991). As previously noted by Arregui, the district court in the
instant matter found "no deception on the part of the chiropractor [Dr. Tarnai]". Tr. p.
62, Ll. 4-6.
CONCLUSION

This case is not a medical malpractice case. Rather, it involves a claim for bodily
injuries brought by Arregui against her chiropractic physician for negligently causing
Arregui to suffer a stroke when treating her on June 4, 2007. It is clear the legislature
intended only for those physicians licensed to practice medicine in the state of Idaho to
reap the protections of Idaho Code §§ 6-1012/6-1013. Other arguments advanced by
Chiropractor Main in Respondent's Brief are adequately covered in Arregui's Opening
Brief, and therefore will not be rehashed here.

Wherefore, Arregui respectfully maintains her request of this Court to reverse the
district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Chiropractor Main.
DATED this ~ day of September, 2011.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

i

day of September, 2011, I served a true

and correct copy of the foregoing document by delivering the same to each of the
following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows:
Bmailed
o hand delivered
o transmitted fax machine
to: (208)319-2601

Richard H. Greener, Esq.
Loren K. Messerly, Esq.
Greener, Burke & Shoemaker, P.A.
The Banner Bank Building
950 W. Bannock St., Ste. 900
Boise, ID 83702

JOHNSON & MON ELEONE, L.L.P.
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